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bOOMERANG HOMELESS FAMILIES 
Aggressive rehousing Policies in New York City
For the past eight years, the Bloomberg Administration has 
struggled in vain to control the number of homeless families 
in New York City. It has launched one policy initiative after 
another to reduce the shelter census, each with limited, if 
any, long-term success. Today, the census stands at a stagger-
ing 9,543 families and 14,537 children residing in shelters. 
Furthermore, this Administration, whether intentionally or 
not, has become more dependent on for-profit welfare hotels 
and numerous subpar temporary housing units scattered 
throughout the city than at any other time since the 1980s. 
In sum, by all accounts the Administration’s ambitious five-
year goal to reduce homelessness by two-thirds has derailed.
A Tale of Two Terms
While many factors drive the number of families who  
enter and exit the shelter system, a closer look at the correla-
tion between the dynamics of those entering shelter and the 
Administration’s policies between 2002 and 2009 offer use-
ful insights. 
The Bloomberg Administration’s first term (2002–2005) 
can be characterized as a “stable period” for the family shel-
ter system. During this time an annual average of roughly 
9,000 families entered shelter. More importantly, the num-
ber of recidivist, or boomerang families—those who exit 
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shelter only to later return—averaged about 2,200 families 
annually over the period (see Figure 1). What the data il-
lustrate is that while family homelessness was an ongoing 
problem, it was a rather stable one. The demand for shelter 
and the number of recidivist families remained fairly con-
stant, and yielded a balanced and manageable system. 
Beginning in 2005, the dynamics of the family shelter 
system began to change significantly. The unpredictable 
number of families entering shelter and the steady climb in 
the proportion of recidivist families clearly demarcate the 
Administration’s second term as an “unstable period” (see 
Figure 1). The high cost of housing, the economic crisis, and 
rising unemployment often have been cited as factors driv-
ing the dramatic increases in families residing in shelter. 
While these are clearly factors, what they do not explain is 
why the number of recidivist families as a proportion of the 
total entering the system has steadily increased throughout 
Bloomberg’s second term. Specifically, recidivist or boomer-
ang families averaged 2,264, or 25%, of that total during 
the Administration’s first term; this proportion climbed to 
an average of 4,702, or 40%, during the second term. At first 
blush, the dynamics of the number of eligible families and 
those of recidivist families might appear to be independent 
of each other, but a closer look at the change in the Adminis-
tration’s policies suggests they are not. 
The Rehousing Initiatives
Interestingly, the timing of the increases in eligible and 
recidivist families coincided with the implementation of 
the Department of Homeless Services’ (DHS) plan to end 
homelessness, Uniting for Solutions Beyond Shelter. In 2005, the 
cornerstone of the plan for families was an aggressive rehous-
ing program, Housing Stability Plus (HSP), which provided 
City-funded rental subsidies to move families quickly from 
shelter to permanent housing. Lasting five years, a family’s 
rent subsidy was reduced 20% each year after the first year, 
requiring them to make up the difference as they theoreti-
cally moved toward self-sufficiency through employment. 
Almost immediately, HSP stalled as families were unable to 
pay their required share of the rent. By 2007, its third year, 
HSP was discontinued and, for all intents and purposes, was 
replaced with a new rehousing initiative, the Work Advantage 
Program (WAP). Under this initiative, qualified working 
homeless families receive a 100% City-funded rental subsidy 
for up to two years. During these two years, DHS makes 
rental payments directly to landlords, while families are asked 
to make a symbolic $50 contribution toward their monthly 
rent. At the end of two years, rental payments from DHS 
to landlords stop and families must pay their rent in full in 
order to keep their apartments. As with HSP, WAP assumes 
families will move toward financial self-sufficiency during 
this two-year period. And again, as with HSP, there are inher-
ent problems with WAP that are just beginning to emerge. 
The availability of rental subsidies through HSP and WAP 
drew increasing numbers of families into the shelter system. 
Less obvious is the evidence that the shift to aggressive re-
housing policies fueled recidivism, profoundly destabilizing 
the manageable system of earlier years: from 2005 to 2009 
eligible families increased by 58% while recidivism for the 
same period shot up an unprecedented 137%. The system 
had become unbalanced. If trends continue, the system will 
become unmanageable. Projections for 2010 indicate that 
roughly 16,650 families will be found eligible, including a 
staggering 6,600 boomerang families (see Figure 1).1
Have well-intentioned rehousing policies become their own 
worst enemy? Certainly many families move on to perma-
nent housing with success, but an increasing percentage have 
not and cannot. They lack the self-sufficiency skills such as 
work experience and education to obtain, let alone maintain, 
gainful employment. Furthermore, they are victims of family 
violence or are grappling with child welfare or mental health 
issues. Simply pushing homeless families into housing with 
a rental subsidy and a dream without addressing their needs 
spells failure as exhibited by the dramatic increases in recidi-
vism. These boomerang families experience a cycle of being 
shuffled off to housing only to eventually return to where 
they started—the shelter—and at what cost to the City? 
Prior to the aggressive rehousing policies of the Bloomberg 
Administration, the average cost of recidivism was approxi-
mately $68 million annually, and it was declining. But after 
HSP and WAP took hold, the cost of recidivism more than 
doubled to $141 million annually—and shows no sign of 
abating.2 In turn, recidivist families could cost the City 
nearly $200 million in 2010.
A close look at the data suggests that there is far more to 
reducing family homelessness than just aggressive rehousing. 
New York City’s family shelter system has a history dat-
ing back almost three decades. There were lessons learned 
and now forgotten from the chaotic days of housing almost 
one-half of all homeless families in rundown, crime-ridden, 
profiteering welfare hotels and congregate shelters.3 Over 
time, the City phased out welfare hotels and phased in 
service-enriched and regulated non-profit shelters, provid-
ing a continuum of care to give families the opportunity to 
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gain the skills necessary for a successful move to permanent 
housing—and reducing the possibility of their boomerang-
ing back. As a result, recidivism (and its cost) declined from 
1990 to 2002, going from roughly 50% to a low of 22%.4 
But with rapid rehousing initiatives, recidivism has climbed 
to a new high of 40% in 2009. 
Conclusion
Has the City’s family shelter system come full circle? 
Are current DHS housing and shelter policies pushing it 
backward to the squalor and failures of the 1980s? Do ag-
gressive rehousing policies stimulate family homelessness 
and recidivism? And do the growing number of boomerang 
families spell failure at a high cost?
At a minimum, this brief suggests that aggressive rehousing 
policies do not work for all homeless families, and result in 
excessive costs. The destabilizing policies of the Administra-
tion require an honest review. The system should return to 
doing what it was originally set up to do: preparing families 
for permanent independent living. Those families who have 
the greatest probability for success should be moved to hous-
ing immediately, but those who do not, should not. It makes 
little sense to rapidly move increasingly large numbers of 
unprepared families to housing without understanding why 
so many are boomeranging back. If quickly moving families 
is considered success, then the large numbers returning to 
shelter must be considered failure. In reality, the system is 
broken, out of balance, and needs repair. 
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